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With the emergence of innovative (networked) organization forms such as enhanced supply chain 
collaboration and modern forms of public-private partnerships (PPP), effective and efficient 
collaboration among network participants becomes crucial but often difficult to achieve. One of 
the leading factors which cause such defective collaboration is the asymmetric information issue 
among the network participants. Two identifiable problems resulted by the asymmetric 
information are the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Former studies mainly 
positioned asymmetric information problems within the context of traditional business 
environment; in this paper we suggest that similar problems may also occur in the Government to 
Business (G2B) context. We discuss these issues via a collaborative pilot case study (hereafter, 
Beer Living Lab) between the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (DutchTCA) and a Dutch 
beer company (Beer Co.). The paper reveals that both moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems may occur during the G2B interactions and tamper the relationships between the two. In 
addressing these problems, we propose an advanced information technology (IT) solution, drawing 
upon an effective and efficient information sharing schema that can on the one hand minimize the 
moral hazard by enhancing supply chain management for the business and on the other hand 
preventing tax fraud for the government. Further we argue that the application of the advanced IT 
may serve as a strong signaling and screening tool for overcoming the adverse selection problem 
during the PPP forming and result in a win-win situation. The insights learned should benefit those 
involved in various inter-organizational business networks, partnership as well as supply chain 
management settings. 
 






The emergence of new lateral organizational forms (e.g., Internet-based supply chain partnerships) 
has been a phenomenon for e-business over the last decade. Collaborative and networked inter-
organizational forms have provided competitive advantages that a single organization can hardly 
achieve alone. Not only industry can benefit from such inter-organizational networks, the public 
sector can benefit from forming collaborative networks with businesses as well. Potential benefits 
are clearly identifiable, especially in the government tax and customs domain. For example, the 
estimated annual savings of introducing electronic invoicing systems across the EU governments 
would exceed €50 billion (EU Commission, 2006b). Somehow, forming such G2B collaborations 
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are often difficult. Facing the current situation that the government procedures are mostly still 
paper based and not necessarily harmonized, and different concerns between government and 
business (e.g., different value perspectives, legislation/political concerns), the problems caused by 
the information asymmetry are almost inevitable and will temper the effectiveness of the network 
collaboration.  
 
Different with former studies, we expand the theory of asymmetric information to the IS network 
research and focus on the role of IT in solving with the asymmetric information problems; in 
addition, we extend the analysis of information asymmetry from the traditional B2B environment 
to the G2B inter-organizational network settings. In this paper, we provide clearer insights on: 1) 
how information may influence organizational behaviour and thus play an important role for 
setting up the inter-organizational networks; 2) what the special concerns of information 
asymmetry and its related problems are under the G2B context; 3) especially, we provide a case 
demonstration on how such problems can be identified in the real world setting and how inter-
organizational IT solutions should be conducted to cope with the asymmetric information 
problems.  
 
With a current case study of the Beer Living Lab (BeerLL), we identify two typical asymmetric 
information problems, namely, the moral hazard (happens when collecting business tax) and the 
adverse selection (happens when government selecting/certifying private partners) problems. A 
modern IT solution (TREC with EPCIS, see section 4) that may provide an effective and efficient 
information sharing schema is proposed. The solution mitigates the moral hazard problem by on 
one hand enhancing supply chain management (SCM) for businesses and on the other hand 
preventing tax fraud for the government. We further argue that, the application of advanced IT 
(e.g., TREC device) may serve as a strong signalling and screening tool from preventing the 
adverse selection problem for the PPP forming. The results from this paper may provide EU 
governments more effective selection criteria for the AEO certification. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, In Section 2, we give a short introduction of the 
theory of asymmetric information and the two economic problems (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) caused by the information asymmetry. In Section 3, we focus on the asymmetric 
information problems in the G2B relationships and how this may influence the relationship 
forming. In Section 4, a case study of Beer Living Lab is introduced and recommended solutions 






The theory of asymmetric information has been lively developed in the field of economic research 
for the last two decades. The prominent foundations for this theory were established by George 
Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970), Michael Spence (Spence, 1973) and Joseph Stiglitz (Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1976). Information asymmetry occurs when one party has more or better information 
than the other party; it assumes that at least one party to a transaction has better relevant 
information whereas the other(s) do not. Typically it happens in a transaction that the seller who 
knows more about the product than the buyer (e.g., selling a second-hand car), however, it is also 
possible for the reverse to be true: the buyer knows more than the seller (e.g., buying an insurance 
policy). Information asymmetry has mass effect on the business networks, e.g., supply chains. 
Fiala (2005) indicates that information asymmetry is a key source of supply chain inefficiency and 
strategic partnerships and information sharing can help to cope with the “bullwhip effect”1 (see 
(Lee et al., 1997b; Lee et al., 1997a)) caused by the information asymmetry in supply chains. 
Because of lacking information and information lagging among supply partners, the 
demand/supply in supply chain can not be well managed and the quality of the product is hard to 
maintain. Mishra et al. (2007) point out that information distortion may reduce the benefit levels or 
                                                           
1  It describes growing variation upstream in a supply chain,  which is one of the most poignant 
demonstrations that decentralized decision making can lead to poor supply chain performance. For details, 
refer to Lee et al. [20, 21]. 
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even stop information sharing in supply chains. There are two typical problems asymmetric 
information may trigger, namely, moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Moral hazard refers to “situations where one side of the market can't observe the actions of the 
other. For this reason it is sometimes called a hidden action problem” (Varian, 2002). In addition, 
it means the chance, or hazard, that a party in a transaction with more information about its 
intentions or actions behaves in a way that a party with less information would consider 
inappropriate, or in the extreme, "immoral". It arises because an individual or institution in a 
transaction does not bear the full consequences or can hide the consequences of its actions without 
counter party knowing, and therefore has a tendency or incentive to act inappropriately. An 
example of moral hazard is when people are more likely to behave recklessly if insured, either 
because the insurer cannot observe this behaviour or cannot effectively retaliate against it, for 
example by failing to renew the insurance.  
 
Adverse selection generally refers to a market process in which bad results occur due to 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, where the "bad" products or customers are 
more likely to be selected and the “good” ones are driven out of the market. It has been discussed 
extensively in the fields of economics, insurance, and risk theory. An example of adverse selection 
in the insurance market is when people who are of high risk are more likely to buy insurance, 
because the insurance company cannot effectively discriminate against them, the same premiums 
are set by the insurer for both groups with high risk and low risk. The insurance company 
anticipates or learns that the cost of the combined policy holders exceeds that of the general 
population, and sets the higher premiums accordingly. The result is that people with lower risks 
tend to go uninsured. Furthermore, as more low risk people are leaving, the premiums have to be 
raised further such that more people are driven out of the policy. Another famous example is 
illustrated by (Akerlof, 1970) for the second hand car market, which is referred as the "lemon 
market"--people buying used cars do not know whether they are "lemons" (bad cars) or "cherries" 
(good ones), so they are willing to pay a average price that lies in between the lemons and cherries. 
As a result, the same situation as in the insurance market happens here, the “cherries” will be 
driven out and “lemons” will dominate the market. The similar findings are also supported by the 
recent e-commerce research of Liao & Cheung (2001) that the “poor vendor quality, especially as 
regards “lemons”, is identified as a significant disincentive to virtual retailing over the Internet”. 
 
Both moral hazard and adverse selection can be explained in the agency theory [related theory 
with asymmetric information, more details see (Eisenhardt, 1989)] as agency problems, which 
comprise two forms that  agency problems may take shape. Arrow (1984) equates these two terms 
with hidden action and hidden information, respectively. Moral hazard arises when the action 
undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a differential value to the agent as compared to 
the principal. Adverse selection problems arise when the agent has more information than the 
principal.  
 
With the fast development of the IT (information technology), more recently, the theory of 
asymmetric information has been expanded in  the field of economics of information technology 
and discussed by various researches [e.g., (Garicano & Kaplan, 2001; Varian, 2002; Varian et al., 
2004; Wigand et al., 1997; Stiglitz, 2000; Kauffman & Mohtadi, 2003)]. These papers however, 
mainly focus on the economic impacts of the information technology (i.e., the value of 
information, information goods and involving transaction costs etc.); very little insights have been 
given on how IT should be implemented to cope with various asymmetric information problems. 
 
 
Asymmetric Information Problems between Business and 
Government  
 
As discussed in the last section, former studies mainly focus on the effect of asymmetric 
information under the market oriented (e.g., labor market, commodity market, insurance market 
and stock market) business context. Government, on the other hand was perceived to be out of the 
scope of the free market, due to its traditional functions of rule setting, intervening and controlling. 
For this reason, very little attention has been paid to the asymmetric information issues between 
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profit driven businesses and public good oriented government. However, the recent movement of 
the public sector transformation of forming the so called public-private partnerships (PPP), which 
a government and a private entity collaboratively undertake traditionally public activity (Naschold 
& von Otter, 1996), has made the boundary  between the government and private business become 
less and less obvious. In this section we put our focal point on this transforming regime and 
discuss whether asymmetric information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can also 
be triggered during the business and government interaction. 
 
 
Moral Hazard in Government Control 
 
One of the most important roles for government in the G2B relationship is the government control 
role. Such control is especially important for the Tax and Customs Administration, as it is directly 
related with the national tax revenues. EU governments have been experiencing severe loss from 
various tax frauds. According to EU Commission (2006a), estimates of tax fraud of 2 to 2.5% of 
GDP are mentioned, which is about 200 to 250 billion Euro per year at EU level. Such tax fraud is 
a fitting example and can be interpreted as the moral hazard problem caused by the symmetric 
information.  
 
An illustrative example is the VAT (Value added tax) collection. Simply two parties are involved 
here: a private company who is obliged to declare VAT and pay the tax; and a Tax office as a 
government agency who audits the tax report and control the VAT collection. Under perfect 
information, tax office obtains complete information and knows about company’s exact operation; 
in the mean time the private company reports and pays full amount of VAT honestly to the Tax 
office (Figure 1a). However in the real world, the private company always knows better about its 
own operating details and the real value of transactions, whereas the Tax office does not. Private 
company has better information than the Tax office and thus has incentives to hide and even 
falsify certain information from Tax office to get tax advantages. If such incentive is obvious and 
easy to achieve without tax office knowing, or the penalty of defaulting is not severer enough, the 
private company will choose to cheat --- a moral hazard problem is caused that the tax office 









Figure 1b. Moral hazard of tax control (tax fraud) under asymmetric information 
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Adverse Selection in G2B Partnership Forming 
 
The second problem --- adverse selection is more complex than the first one. It happens often 
when government bodies select private partners and give certificates to these companies. The 
current in the spotlight Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) certificate may serve here as a good 
example.  
 
The idea of AEO is that each EU Member State Customs Administration can establish partnerships 
with private sectors and certify them with AEO certifications. The involvement of the private 
companies in AEO will enhance the safety and security of international trade and the certified 
AEOs will enjoy tangible benefits such as fast customs clearance and simplified procedures. 
According to EU parliament and the Council (2005), “Customs authorities, if necessary following 
consultation with other competent authorities, shall grant, the status of ‘Authorized Economic 
Operator’ (AEO) to any economic operator established in the customs territory of the Community. 
An AEO shall benefit from facilitations with regard to customs controls relating to security and 
safety and/or from simplifications provided for under the customs rules.”  
 
A critical issue here is that the AEO certificate is quite unlike other governmental requirements; it 
is voluntary rather than compulsory. It requires “… no obligation for economic operators to 
become AEOs, it is a matter of the operators' own choice based on their specific situation. Nor is 
there any obligation for AEOs to require that their business partners have also to obtain AEO 
status” (EU Commission, 2007). Companies are no longer obliged but can bargain and make their 
own decisions whether or not to qualify for the AEO certificate (at the same time also fulfilling the 
requirements). The increased bargain power from business side makes it rather difficult to promote 
the idea of AEO, as each individual company has its own concerns and specific reasons of joining 
or not. It would be convenient for the EU government to set a non-exclusive single policy for all 
the companies who are willing to participate. However, facing the divergences among 
multinationals and SMEs (small and median sized enterprises), such a single policy is very 
difficult to reach. Though a great effort has been made in developing the most recent AEO 
guidelines (EU Commission, 2007), the implementation of these guidelines still needs to occur.  
 
A problem raised here is that if the government can not effectively differentiate companies and 
only applies a single standard to all the companies in the certificate market, similar adverse 
selection problem like in the insurance market may occur: The “good” (compliant) companies tend 
not to join because the AEO requirement is too strict and they see no fair value for them to 
participate ---“We are compliant companies with good reputation, and our current procedure is 
simpler than others anyway, why should we invest more to get the AEO certificate?” (Based on 
interviews with a Netherlands-based international beer company). On the other hand, the “bad” 
(cheating) companies may see more visible benefit (less checking and simplified procedure may 
create an easier way of making fraud) and are more willing the get the certificate (See Figure 2). 
 
The original purpose of the government is to provide minimal physical control and simplified 
procedure via the AEO certificate to the compliant companies and enforce more control effort on 
the cheating companies. As indicated in the interview with the Dutch Tax and Customs 
Administration (DutchTCA) --- “If companies are already in good control themselves, why should 
we (DutchTCA) waste our resource to exert extra control on them?” However, the consequences 
of the adverse selection problem may reverse government’s expectation: as the “good” companies 
could not get enough incentive to join and will be automatically driven out of the “certificate 
market” by the “bad” ones. And a continuous scenario is even worse: as more “bad” companies 
will take the certificate and commit fraud, the AEO requirement will be set even stricter and 
become less desirable for any “good” companies to join --- a market failure is created. 
Nevertheless, there are remedies for adverse selection problem. Further elaboration on this issue 
will be discussed in later sections of this paper. 
 
 




Figure 2. Adverse selection caused during AEO certification procedure (Market failure) 
 
 
Case study: Beer Living Lab 
 
To further elaborate issues discussed above, we present a real life case study of a collaborative 
project (referred to as the Beer Living Lab) between the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration 
(DutchTCA) and a NL-based international beer company (Beer Co.). The purpose of the Beer 
Living Lab (BeerLL) is to create a win-win situation between the business and government that on 
the one hand the administrative burden will be lowered for business and on the other hand the tax 
fraud will be minimized and better security and control can be facilitated for the government [the 
detailed discussion of the living lab concept itself is revealed by (Tan et al., 2006; Baida et al., 
2007b)]. The BeerLL is a unique case study that provides researchers a great opportunity of 
carrying out multi-facet researches including eCustoms study (van Stijn et al., 2007), control 
procedure redesign (Baida et al., 2007a; Liu et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2007) and collaborative 
network study (Frößler et al., 2007; Rukanova et al., 2007) etc. In proceeding with the research, 
we found that the informational aspect of the BeerLL is rather interesting that it influences not only 
organizational control procedures but also inter-organizational network forming. We link the 
underlying phenomenon in BeerLL with the theory of information asymmetry and discuss how it 
may play a role here. Further we elicit how advanced IT solutions (e.g., the BeerLL solution) may 
cope with the asymmetric information problems and create a win-win situation between the 
government and businesses. 
 
 
Moral Hazard in BeerLL 
 
Beer Co. (NL-based, but has international subsidiaries like Beer Co. UK, US) as an international 
brewery company carries out a huge amount of trade everyday, involving with multiple supply 
chain partners and government agencies. The moral hazard problem mainly appears in two places 
in its inter-organizational trade procedures, namely along supply chains and between business and 
government interactions. Along the supply chain, Beer Co. is involved with many suppliers, 
distributors around the globe. From raw material to the final product at the customers, the amount 
of information interchanged in Beer Co’s supply chain is considerable. To minimize problems 
caused by the information asymmetry, Beer Co. would like to have an information sharing schema 
that can provide full control and transparency of its supply chains. Such schema shall not only 
enhance the order-make management of Beer Co., but also safeguard its brand image and break 
down possible counterfeit that may be caused by the fraudulent supply chain partners. 
 
The other area that moral hazard problem can be triggered is laying underneath the interaction 
between businesses and government, especially in the tax report and Customs declaration 
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procedures when DutchTCA collecting taxes and monitoring business activities of the Beer Co. As 
we discussed before, businesses always have better information than the government about their 
own operation. They may have an incentive to hide certain (fraudulent) actions to achieve certain 
benefits. According to our interview with Beer Co. and DutchTCA, several frauds can be involved 
in the BeerLL trade procedure. However, the current tax and Customs control procedure is not 
effective enough to cope with these problems. The main reason behind is that the current Custom 
control is mainly based on the paper based AAD-doc (accompanying administrative document), 
EW2 (excise warehouse) and physical inspections these three methods. Given an example of 
Customs control procedures when Beer Co. exporting beer from NL to UK. The AAD-doc 
performs an essential role in this Customs control procedure. Two roles are performed by the 
AAD-doc, one as export evidence when stamped by EW and UK Customs, the other to identify the 
cargo in case of a physical cargo inspection en route. The AAD-doc accompanies the beer from the 
Netherlands to the UK and is stamped by the EW, then by Customs UK, as a proof that the goods 
have arrived in the UK. Customs UK send the stamped AAD-doc back to the EW who will 
forward it back to BeerCo NL. For control purpose, Customs NL periodically checks BeerCo NL’s 
excise declarations. For the beer that BeerCo NL sold outside the Netherlands, excise exemption is 
given by default and will be verified afterwards by comparing excise declarations with AAD-docs.  
 
There exist two major disadvantages of this procedure 1) Timeliness: transferring of the paper-
based AAD-docs can take weeks or even months, and the verification is done several months later. 
In practice, this checking is often not done at all because it is too labor intensive. As a result, Beer 
Co. NL only submits AAD-docs upon request of Customs NL; 2) Too many parties’ involvement: 
the AAD-doc based control relies on many commercial parties (e.g., Beer Co. NL and UK, EW, 
shipping company) who may have direct interest of violating this control to reach their own 
financial interests. Each one of them (or colluded) has the opportunities to alter or hidden critical 
information/actions (especially, paper based AAD-doc can be easily falsified) from the other, 
which may result in moral hazard and possible control fraud. We interviewed and identify these 
possible moral hazard problems in Table 1. According to the EU Commission [8], excise fraud for 
alcohol in the EU amounts to €1.5 billion yearly, approximately 8% of the total excise duties 
receipts on alcoholic beverages. DutchTCA as a government control agency would like to detect 
and minimize all the possible tax fraud. It requires an information sharing system with control 
efficiency and effectiveness that on the one hand can minimize administrative burden and on the 
other hand may facilitate effective auditing control. 
 
                                                           
2 An excise warehouse is a warehouse which has been authorized by the authorities for the deposit without 
payment of duty of goods liable to excise duty.  
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Redesign Solution: Effective Information Sharing Schema with Imbedded IT Based 
Control  
 
To cope with the problems identified above, Beer Co. together with DutchTCA, academic 
researchers and interested technology providers designed an innovative TO-BE solutions based on 
advance IT. This solution has been piloted since year 2007 and has received quite positive 
feedbacks from various fields in and outside the project.  The redesign solution sets up effective 
inter-organizational information sharing schema as well as imbedding IT based control mechanism 
into the system.    
• First, the BeerLL solution provides an effective and efficient information sharing schema 




Possible defaulting parties Description of hidden actions Current control 
mechanisms 
1.   Single party defaulting One of the parties along the supply chain does 
not fulfill(intentionally or unintentionally) its 
responsibilities and hides this from others 
AAD-doc., EW, Physical 
checks 
 1.1 Beer Co. NL  Beer Co. NL does not pay excise of beer within 
NL (Claim beer selling abroad but actually sells 
in NL) 
AAD-doc. 
 1.2 Beer Co. UK  Beer Co. UK sends falsified AAD back to Beer 
Co. NL, but does not register it in their 
administration nor reports to Customs. Beer Co. 
UK sells beer without paying excise  
EW  
 1.3 Beer Co. NL/ Beer 
Co. UK 
Beer Co. NL/UK presents a product as a 
product from another category(soft drink 
instead of beer) 
Physical checks (Random 
checks on Beer Co. 
NL/UK) 
 1.4 Excise warehouse 
(EW) 
EW does not pay or pay less excise (rarely) EW certification  
 1.5 Retailer with EW Retailer with EW does not pay or pay less 
excise  
AAD-doc. 
E.g. Virtual shipment A party buys goods from Beer Co. NL and 
“virtually” ships the goods to a country with 
low excise percentages (e.g. Poland), but sells 
them in NL or UK.  
AAD( Documentation), 
physical stop checks 
 Fake Beer Co. Parties impose to be trustworthy companies 
(like Beer Co.) by sending goods packed with 
the Beer Co. label and falsely stating that the 
product is indeed made by Beer Co. By doing 
so fake parties enjoys less control than it should 
have and will not pay excises over these 
products, even  
Physical stop checks & 
Authorization (Possibly 
Beer Co. AEO 
certification?)  
 Smuggling Carriers (criminal truck drivers) smuggle illegal 
goods within  Beer Co. containers 
Asset safe guard & 
Physical checks (Random 
checks on Beer Co. 
NL/UK) 
2. Multi-party collusion Parties collude with each other  in order not to 
get advantage of the system (e.g. pay less 
excises) 
Third party checking, and 
random physical checks 
 2.1 Beer Co. NL& Beer 
Co. UK 
Beer Co. NL& Beer Co. UK collude with each 
other  in order not to pay excises 
EW 
 2.2 Beer Co. UK & 
Retailer with EW 
Beer Co. UK & Retailer with EW collude with 
each other in order not to pay excises 
AAD-doc. 
 2.3 Beer Co.(NL+UK) & 
retailer with EW 
Beer Co.(NL+UK) & retailer with EW collude 
with each other in order not to pay excises 
Physical checks 
E.g. Black market Beer Co. NL ships excisable goods to UK 
accompanied with an AAD, but Beer Co. UK 
(can be other companies) colludes with retailer 
with EW. The goods disappear in the black 
market without excise payment. Customs will 
not receive AAD for the goods. The fraud will 
be revealed but too late-- three month period 
EW & Reconciliation 
(Independent check of 
performance) 
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definition of inter-organizational information system (IOS) is given by Cash and 
Konsynski (1985) as "an automated information system shared by two or more 
companies". An IOS is built around information technology that facilitates the creation, 
storage, transformation, and transmission of information, which differs from an internal 
information system by allowing information to be sent across organizational boundaries. 
Wigand et al. (1997) discuss in their book various of organizational boundaries and 
information models for setting up IOS that can cope with these limitations. The setting up 
of the BeerLL ISO relies on the Electronic Product Code Information Services (EPCIS) 
using a Service-Oriented Architecture. Container Information Services (CIS) use the 
EPCIS non-proprietary standards of EPCglobal3. The data sharing mechanisms use a 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to allow secure information sharing between supply 
chain partners as well as government agencies. All supply chain partners (e.g., seller, 
buyer and carrier) will publish their data regarding a shipment in the EPCIS databases; 
the data will then be available for other supply chain partners as well as for the 
government. 
• Second, the redesign procedure takes imbedded control mechanism into account. The 
imbedded control is realized via the application of the TREC4 smart seal technology for 
container security, which has the following features: (1) sensors to monitor parameters 
including humidity, temperature, shock and unauthorized container openings; (2) real-
time container location traceability through continuous satellite connection; (3) 
connection to backend systems during transport; and (4) ability to send information and 
alerts in case of predefined rules (e.g., container arrives at or leaves a geo-zone; 
temperature lower or higher than predefined limits). According to the BeerLL vision, 
Beer Co. will ship its goods in TREC-armed containers. Being smart seals, the TREC 
devices can ensure shipment integrity, and enhance security. By means of using handheld 
devices, customs officers can use TREC devices to obtain access to the EPCIS databases 
of all supply chain partners, where commercial data about shipments is available. 
 
Instead of setting up separate direct links between each other, above mentioned organizations will 
set up an inter-organizational information system (IOS) based on the same EPC standards. Each 
partner in the network will extract the data they would like to share from their own Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system to the client EPCIS, from which the shared data can be retrieved. 
And a central EPCIS is applied as an intermediate, which provides directory service that 
collecting, matching and submitting information to the connected parties automatically or based on 
their query. TREC is used as an extra safe lock to ensure that critical information is achieved and 
sent in real-time without fraud. TREC information is sent to the central EPCIS that can be 
retrieved in real-time by network partners. If anything goes wrong (e.g., unauthorized opening of 
container or change of information), TREC will send an automatic alert to the relevant parties. 
Through such an information sharing schema, real time information sharing will be possible along 
the supply chains. And for DutchTCA, it will get all relevant control information not only from 
Beer Co. but also from other supply chain partners and TREC as well, which will make the 
continuous auditing possible (See Figure 4). This IT solution of TREC (or similar technology), 
EPCIS and the service-oriented architecture replaces the current situation where the customs data 
is send from the business to DutchTCA via paper documents. This electronic exchange of data is 
not only much more efficient than the paper-based exchange, but it also enables DutchTCA to look 
for all kind of additional business data that can greatly improve the quality of their risk analysis of 
a business. 
 
                                                           
3 For further details see http://www.epcglobalinc.org, last accessed on Oct 31, 2007. 
4 Further information on TREC is available at http://www.zurich.ibm.com/news/05/trec.html and 
http://www.zurich.ibm.com/csc/process/securetradelane.html, last accessed on Oct 31, 2007.  









The second issue as we discussed before is the adverse selection problem caused by the 
information asymmetry during the public- private partnership (PPP) forming. Typically, when 
government certifies businesses, such problem often results in a market failure that the “cherries” 
are driven out and the market will be glutted with “lemons”. The adverse selection problem 
puzzles the earlier discussed AEO certification as well. As the introduction of AEO will take legal 
effect in the European Community (EC) from 1 January 2008 (Joint Customs Consultative 
Committee (JCCC), 2007), further developing and guidelining the concept becomes an exigent 
issue. By studying the BeerLL case, we figure out a way out of the AEO adverse selection 
problem. We find that the application of advanced IT may serve as a strong signaling tool for 
businesses to show their types, which will enable the government to effectively differentiate 
“good” and “bad” companies for certification. “Signaling” has been considered as one of the most 
important strategies of solving asymmetric information problems in the job market and capital 
market [e.g., (Spence, 1973; Gertner et al., 1988)]. The general idea behind signaling is that one 
party (informed party) conveys some meaningful information (signal) about itself to another party 
(under informed party); with this extra information, the under informed party is able to 
differentiate different types of the other party and make sensible selection decisions. O’Reilly 
(1983) indicates that the quality of decision making increases with the decision maker’s 
information level. However, if the quality of information itself can hardly or not at all be 
evaluated, a decision-maker’s visible information behavior is often used as an evaluation 
substitute for the quality of information and therefore decisions (Feldman & March, 1981). They 
emphasize that information behavior can have important signaling effects on observers. In the 
BeerLL scenario, good companies like Beer Co. positively signal themselves with the adoption of 
the EPICS and TREC and the government (DutchTCA) will make the certificate procedure easier 
and more attractive for them. In the meanwhile, for the “bad” company A, as the signaling cost of 
implementing the required IT solution will overcome the potential fraud benefit it can get, it will 
simply decide not to take the AEO certificate. Anyhow, if the “bad” company B would like to have 
simplified tax and customs procedure and decides to take the AEO certificate, it needs to fulfill the 
IT requirement by either using TREC or other similar IT support. The implementation of the 
advanced IT solution itself will minimize the cheating possibilities of the “bad” companies and 
may finally transfer the “bad” companies to “good” ones. At the same time, instead of passively 
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receiving “signals” from applicants, DutchTCA can also actively screen 5  companies by 
embedding the application of advance IT in the AEO requirement that all applied companies 
should fulfill the IT requirement in order to get the certificate. With the IT screening from the 
government side and positive signaling by using IT from the business side, the adverse selection 
problem is tackled. The market will automatically correct itself that “good” companies will join 










By analyzing the BeerLL case with asymmetric information, we realize that procedure redesign is 
not as simple as process automation or mere replacement of paper documents with the electronic 
ones. Especially when organizations work together and form an inter-organizational network, 
special concerns of information sharing need be taken into account: how the information can be 
shared effectively with the minimum asymmetry, how the “lemons” can be avoided. As long as 
these problems are addressed, for each asymmetric information problem, there exist (or will be) 
solutions. Some of the requirements can be abstracted from the BeerLL case, i.e. (1) end-to-end 
security, (2) data sharing with the supply chain and DutchTCA etc. We also suggest that AEO 
should be protected against the danger of “lemons” that we recommend adding IT requirements to 
help with signalling and screening.  
 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
This paper presents a linkage between the economic theory of information asymmetry and IS 
network and information flow research. Despite the asymmetric information problems in the 
business world, we find that such problems are also prominent in the G2B context, in particular for 
Tax and Customs offices. By studying a collaborative pilot between government and business--- 
the Beer Living Lab, we identify two asymmetric information problems, namely, moral hazard and 
adverse selection.  We argue that application of advanced IT may effectively cope with the two 
                                                           
5 Screening is another way of combating adverse selection, different with signalling, which implies that the 
informed agent moves first, screening means that underinformed party can induce the other party to reveal 
their information, for example by providing a menu of choices in such a way that the choice depends on the 
private information of the other party (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). 
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above motioned problems: IT based IOS enables network partners effectively sharing information 
with each other that minimizes the moral hazard problem; and the application of IT itself may 
serve as a strong signalling/screening tool for the network partners make sensible selection 
decisions that overcomes the adverse selection problem. The findings from this paper may provide 
valuable knowledge for the EU governments to further develop the AEO certification guidelines. 
 
The paper at the current stage only reveals the phenomenon of asymmetric information during the 
G2B network forming, its applications and some recommended solutions. The scope of the paper 
will be expanded by our future research, which will further develop the conceptual framework and 
validate it with both descriptive (case study) and quantitative (empirical research) method. Further 
we will pay special attention to a dynamic network, that is, how changes of IT strategy of one 
network partner may influence the behaviour and decision making of other network partners; what 
the new equilibrium will be after this change and how this can be optimized. All in all, research of 
information economics in the IS field is still under developing; this paper serves as an explorative 
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